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WHEN THE CHIEF JUSTICE SERVES IN THE 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
Roy E. Brownell II
*
 
The question of which governmental branch (or branches) the Vice 
President falls within is one that received a fair amount of attention 
during the tenure of Dick Cheney.
1
  The Vice President performs a 
myriad of tasks for the President, but he also presides over the Senate, 
thus placing him in both political branches.
2
  But what of the Chief 
Justice when he presides over the chamber during presidential 
impeachment trials?  Should he also be viewed as part of the legislative 
branch during these rare occasions?
3
  It has been vigorously argued that 
he cannot be so categorized.
4
  Yet, as counterintuitive as it may initially 
seem,
5
 the Chief Justice should indeed be considered part of the 
legislative branch during presidential impeachment trials.
6
   
 
* The author, a counsel in the U.S. Senate, would like to thank Joel Goldstein, Louis Fisher, Don 
Wallace, Jr., Harold Relyea, Seth Barrett Tillman, Todd Garvey, Fred Karem, and Russell Coleman 
for their comments on the piece.  The opinions expressed herein and any errors are the author’s 
alone.    
 1. See, e.g., Todd Garvey, Note, A Constitutional Anomaly:  Safeguarding Confidential 
National Security Information Within the Enigma That is the American Vice Presidency, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 565 (2008).    
 2. See Roy E. Brownell II, Vice Presidential Secrecy:  A Study in Comparative 
Constitutional Privilege and Historical Development, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 423, 497-500 n.323 
(2010).  For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Roy E. Brownell II, Constitutional Chameleon 
(forthcoming article).      
 3. There have been only two presidential impeachment trials in American history:  Andrew 
Johnson in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1999.    
 4. See Garvey, supra note 1, at 592-93 (quoting Sen. Durbin taking this view in a 2007 letter 
to Cheney).       
 5. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 243 n.1 (1993) (White, J., concurring).  But see 
id. at 234 (majority opinion) (rejecting Justice White’s position).  For an assertion that one can hold 
“[o]bligations to two branches” but still be part of just one, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 
746 & n.10 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).              
 6. At least one other article has impliedly taken this position, but none has examined the 
question at any length.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:  
Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1123 n.384 (1994).    
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It should be noted up front that there is no accepted test for 
discerning which branch an official is “in.”7  Many factors, such as text, 
structure, historical precedent, and practical concerns, all contribute to 
making such a determination.  With that in mind, the reasons for the 
Chief Justice being considered part of the legislative branch in this 
context are manifold.  First, as a matter of constitutional text, the Chief 
Justice during presidential impeachment trials steps into the shoes of the 
president of the Senate.  His authority in this vein is granted by Article I, 
which predominantly governs the legislative branch,
8
 and not Article III, 
which does the same for the federal judiciary.
9
  Indeed, the only 
reference to the Chief Justice in the entirety of the Constitution occurs in 
this context in Article I.
10
  In his role as presiding officer, the Chief 
Justice has power only under this article to fall back on.
11
  The Chief 
Justice carries with him no residual Article III authority; he exercises no 
power of judicial review.   
More specifically, the Chief Justice’s authority is provided by 
Section 3, Clause 6 of Article I.
12
  It provides that “[w]hen the President 
of the United States is tried [in the Senate], the Chief Justice shall 
preside”.13  This provision follows Clause 4, which lays out the Vice 
President’s authority to preside over the Senate, and Clause 5, which 
does the same for the President Pro Tempore.
14
  The fact that the three 
clauses governing who presides over the Senate appear consecutively 
reinforces the notion that they should be read together.  That in turn 
leads to the conclusion that when the Chief Justice takes the gavel, he 
 
 7. For judicial treatment of how to categorize positions created by statute (as opposed to 
those created by the Constitution), compare Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States 
Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 36 n.1 (1985) (applying an accountability/control test) with 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935) (applying a functional test).    
 8. See, e.g., Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2005).   
 9. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 342 (2000).        
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.  See also Edward T. Swaine, Hail, No:  Changing the 
Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 1724 (2006).     
 11. See 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:  ITS HISTORY AND 
PRACTICE 847 (1960) (“[T]he rules make evident the intent that when the Senate is sitting for the 
trial of an impeachment, the presiding officer shall act as the agent or mouthpiece of the Senate and 
not as an independent authority.”).           
 12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 13. Id.  See also Swaine, supra note 10, at 1713 n.22 (discussing Senate rules governing who 
presides during an impeachment trial of an acting president and a federal statute implicitly 
governing who presides if the chief justiceship is vacant or the occupant is disabled).     
 14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 4, 5.    
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possesses all the attributes that the Senate’s other presiding officers 
enjoy in that same capacity.
15
   
Second, impeachment is not listed among the aspects of judicial 
branch power under Article III.
16
  Quite simply, as a matter of text, the 
judicial branch—as opposed to the Chief Justice in a legislative branch 
capacity—is in no way part of the impeachment process.17     
A third textual provision reaffirms this view.  Article I grants the 
Senate “the sole Power to try all impeachments,”18 which poses a major 
obstacle to the view that the Chief Justice is always in the judicial 
branch.  How could the Chief Justice—as presiding officer of the Senate 
during presidential impeachment trials—not be considered part of the 
Senate given the upper chamber’s exclusive authority to try all 
impeachments?  To view him otherwise is to contradict the 
constitutional mandate that the Senate alone carries out this duty.   
Fourth, a broader structural feature is also at play that further 
reinforces the view that the Chief Justice is part of the legislative branch 
during presidential impeachment trials.  It has long been established that 
the judicial branch may not have its final determinations appealed to the 
other branches.
19
  The Supreme Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc. 
held that “invalidation of final [judicial] judgments [is] . . .  categorically 
unconstitutional.”20  Yet, as presiding officer of the Senate, any rulings 
by the Chief Justice may be (and indeed have been) overridden by the 
Senate.
21
   
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that regarding 
impeachment it is the Senate—and not the judiciary—that has the final 
word:  “the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, were not 
chosen to have any role in impeachments.”22  This view was 
acknowledged by Chief Justice Salmon Chase just prior to the 
impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson.  In a letter to the body, 
 
 15. Cf. RICHARD C. SACHS, THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE:  HISTORY AND 
AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE 11 (2003).   
 16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.   
 17. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234 (1993).      
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 19. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995).      
 20. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1996) (encapsulating the Plaut holding). 
 21. See Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials, in 
SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. 104-1, at 178-79 (1st Sess. 1995).  See also HAYNES, supra note 11, at 
848.  Chief Justice John Jay, Justice William Cushing, and a district court judge concluded in a 
letter in Hayburn’s Case that actions taken by a judge that could be overruled by a political branch 
ipso facto meant that the judge was outside of the judicial branch in that setting.  See 2 Dall. (2 
U.S.) 409, 414 (1792).              
 22. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234 (1993) (emphasis added).    
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Chase expressed concern about the course the Senate was taking.
23
  “I 
am informed,” he wrote “that the Senate has proceeded upon other views 
[than my own]; and it is not my purpose to contest what its superior 
wisdom may have directed.”24  Thus, having the Chief Justice considered 
part of the judicial branch while at the same time permitting his rulings 
to be overturned by the Senate would violate a fundamental precept of 
the federal judiciary:  that a final judicial branch judgment may not be 
voided by either political branch.  In order to escape this structural 
dilemma, the Chief Justice must be considered part of the legislative 
branch when presiding over the Senate.   
Fifth, these textual and structural factors are enhanced by custom
25
 
and practical considerations.  For example, the Chief Justice—like the 
Vice President in more commonplace settings—can vote to break ties 
during presidential impeachment trials.
26
  In the Johnson impeachment 
proceedings, Chief Justice Chase twice voted to resolve a Senate 
impasse.
27
  The initial vote was challenged but ultimately upheld by the 
chamber.
28
     
Moreover, as alluded to earlier, the Chief Justice—like the Vice 
President and President Pro Tempore—can make a variety of 
parliamentary rulings subject to possible Senate override.
29
  In this 
context, the Chief Justice may even be referred to by senators as “Mr. 
President,”30 again clearly denoting his legislative branch role and his 
status as a fill-in for the president of the Senate.  As such, the Chief 
Justice is not resolving cases and controversies under Article III; he is 
participating in the internal business of the Senate under Article I.      
Further, in carrying out his Senate role, the Chief Justice has to rely 
heavily on legislative branch personnel to complete his work.  During 
the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton, this reality was laid bare 
in a humorous exchange between Chief Justice William Rehnquist and 
one of the House managers.     
 
 23. See Communication from the Chief Justice, CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1644 
(1868) [hereinafter Chase letter].         
 24. Id. (emphasis added).    
 25. The role of past practice in separation of powers disputes is entitled to no small degree of 
deference.  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989).   
 26. See PROCEDURE AND GUIDELINES FOR IMPEACHMENT TRIALS IN THE UNITED STATES 
SENATE (REV. ED.), S. DOC. 99-33, at 40-41 (2d Sess. 1986) [hereinafter Procedure].  See also 
CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 62-63 (1868).   
 27. See Procedure, supra note 26, at 40-41.        
 28. See id.   
 29. See id. at 63-64.  It should be remembered that the Chief Justice in this capacity is not 
applying the rules of the Supreme Court.  He is applying the Rules of the Senate.      
 30. See id. at 64.   
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Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON.  Mr. Chief Justice, could I object to the 
form of the question?  That was not proper characterizing what I just 
stated.   
 
The CHIEF JUSTICE.  I don’t think managers—I am not sure whether 
the managers—can the managers object to a question?  (Laughter.)   
 
Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON.  I withdraw my objection.   
 
The CHIEF JUSTICE.  Very well.  I think—the Parliamentarian says 
they can only object to an answer, not to a question, which is kind of 
an unusual thing . . .
31
    
In this situation, Chief Justice Rehnquist closely adhered to the counsel 
provided by the Senate parliamentarian—as Senate presiding officers 
typically do
32—despite his own apparent inclination to the contrary.33  
He did not render his own judgment or even ask his law clerks for an 
answer.  This is because, for the entirety of his tenure as presiding 
officer, the Chief Justice is subject to Senate rules.  Such a principle was 
reflected during a break in the Clinton trial.  In this setting, the Senate 
sergeant at arms had to enforce an upper chamber rule that prohibits 
gambling against the Chief Justice and his law clerks, who were playing 
low-stakes poker.
34
  
In addition, the Chief Justice—like the Vice President—may speak 
from the chair from time to time with the permission of the Senate.
35
  All 
of these practical features—voting to break ties, making rulings subject 
to Senate override, being addressed as “Mr. President,” utilizing Senate 
personnel, being subject to Senate rules, and speaking from the chair 
with Senate permission—reflect the Chief Justice being part of the 
legislative branch in this unique setting.   
 
 31. 145 CONG. REC. 1250 (1999).  A later statement from the chair by Rehnquist could also 
be interpreted as his having viewed himself as part of the legislative branch during the impeachment 
proceedings:  “I underwent the sort of culture shock that naturally occurs when one moves from the 
very structured environment of the Supreme Court to what I shall call, for want of a better phrase, 
the more free-form environment of the Senate.”  145 CONG. REC. 2377 (1999) (emphasis added).      
 32. See, e.g., Patrick O’Connor & Carrie Budoff Brown, Ten Who Could Decide Health Care, 
POLITICO, Mar. 5, 2010.   
 33. See 145 CONG. REC. at 1250.  For more on Rehnquist’s role, see PETER BAKER, THE 
BREACH:  INSIDE THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON 365 (2000); 
NICOL C. RAE & COLTON C. CAMPBELL, IMPEACHING CLINTON:  PARTISAN STRIFE ON CAPITOL 
HILL 132-33 (2004).     
 34. See BAKER, supra note 33, at 364.    
 35. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. at 2377.        
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Yet another practical feature to consider is that the authority of the 
judicial branch has not been utilized during presidential impeachment.  
In the Clinton trial, when confronted with an opportunity to exercise the 
authority of the judicial branch, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointedly 
declined.
36
  He was asked by a senator to intervene in a matter involving 
a lower federal court’s granting of permission to the House managers to 
interview Monica Lewinsky following the beginning of the Senate 
impeachment trial.
37
  The Chief Justice chose not to involve himself in 
the matter.
38
  He even questioned whether he had the authority to preside 
over impeachment trial depositions.
39
  Had Rehnquist considered himself 
part of the judicial branch in the impeachment context, he seemingly 
would have been less hesitant to involve himself in oversight of this 
activity.  Such a stance makes all the more sense when one realizes that 
the Chief Justice was almost certainly not placed in the presiding 
officer’s chair during presidential impeachment trials because he 
represents the judiciary, but instead because he is not the Vice President 
and therefore prevents a conflict of interest.
40
  As Chief Justice Chase 
wrote, “[u]nder the Constitution, . . . it was doubtless thought prudent 
and befitting that the next in succession should not preside in a 
proceeding through which a vacancy might be created.”41 
Finally, concluding the Chief Justice serves in more than one 
branch is hardly outlandish in light of past practice in non-impeachment 
settings.  Take the example of the first Chief Justice, John Jay.  Under 
the direction of President George Washington, he negotiated a major 
treaty with Great Britain in 1794 while on the high court.
42
  In so doing, 
Jay was unquestionably acting as part of the executive branch as it 
enjoys a monopoly over diplomatic negotiation.
43
  Jay himself several 
 
 36. See BAKER, supra note 33, at 345-46.    
 37. Id. at 345, 365. 
 38. Id. at 365.    
 39. Id. at 368.    
 40. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE:  THE INVESTIGATION, 
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 130 (1999); Swaine, supra note 10, at 1724.          
 41. Chase Letter, supra note 23, at 1644.        
 42. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398-99 (1989).     
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).  To highlight still 
further Jay’s placement in the executive branch on that mission, Washington’s refusal to turn over 
documents related to the treaty’s negotiation is routinely cited as an early example of executive 
privilege, not judicial privilege.  See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 116 (2d ed. 1996).         
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years earlier had actually held both the chief justiceship and the top 
position in what would later be called the Department of State.
44  
 
Not long afterward, one of Jay’s successors, Oliver Ellsworth, held 
the positions of Chief Justice and Minister to France at the same time.
45
  
John Marshall, like Jay, was also for a short period both Chief Justice 
and Secretary of State.
46
  Each one of these diplomatic roles not only 
required the act of nomination by the President and acceptance by the 
Chief Justice himself, but also Senate advice and consent.
47
  Thus, 
during the formative years under the Constitution,
48
 all three branches of 
government on several occasions approved this straddling of the 
executive and judicial branches by the Chief Justice.
49
  And, unlike the 
Chief Justice’s role in presidential impeachment trials, none of these 
diplomatic assignments has any basis in constitutional text.  One would 
think that, if the framers and their contemporaries were so untroubled by 
the Chief Justice participating in executive branch activities, they would 
have had no concern whatsoever with his being categorized as part of the 
legislative branch during presidential impeachment trials because they 
had explicitly provided for that role in the Constitution.      
This article’s thesis could be called into some question through four 
potential counterarguments.  First, there is a Supreme Court passage 
from Bowsher v. Synar that seems to point toward the Chief Justice 
remaining within the judicial branch at all times.  The Court opined in 
dictum that “in the impeachment of a President, the presiding officer of 
the ultimate tribunal is not a member of the legislative branch, but the 
Chief Justice of the United States.”50  True enough.  As with the Vice 
President, the Chief Justice is obviously not a member of the legislative 
branch; he is not a senator.  He is not elected to six-year terms; the Chief 
 
 44. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. 
CT. REV. 123, 146 n.105; STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS:  THE ADVISORY ROLE OF 
EARLY JUDGES 92 (1997).        
 45. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 398-99.   
 46. See id. at 399.      
 47. See, e.g., id.     
 48. Constitutional interpretation during this period is entitled to great deference.  See J.W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928).  In 1948, President Harry Truman 
publicly proposed sending Chief Justice Fred Vinson on a diplomatic mission to the Soviet Union.  
Vinson agreed but Truman ultimately rescinded the offer for reasons unrelated to the constitutional 
placement of the Chief Justice.  See DAVID PIETRUSZA, 1948:  HARRY TRUMAN’S IMPROBABLE 
VICTORY AND THE YEAR THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 351-53 (2011).            
 49. For decades, beginning in the early 1790s, the Chief Justice served on the board of the 
Sinking Fund and played an oversight role with respect to the U.S. Mint, two positions which placed 
him “within the administration.”  JAY, supra note 44, at 92-93.         
 50. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986).  For dicta from Justices White and Stevens 
implying the Chief Justice remains at all times in the judicial branch, see supra note 5.        
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Justice has life tenure.  He does not represent a state; he represents the 
nation.  However, like the Vice President,
51
 the Chief Justice is part of 
the legislative branch under certain circumstances.  At the same time, the 
Sergeant at Arms, the Doorkeeper, the parliamentarian, and Senate staff 
are not members of the upper chamber either, but they are without 
question part of the legislative branch.
52
  This distinction between being 
a member of the Senate and a part of the legislative branch is one that 
the Department of Justice has embraced regarding the Vice President.
53
  
The same reasoning is also applicable to the Chief Justice.         
 A second counterargument could assert that the Chief Justice—
like the President—has a functional legislative role to play even if he is 
never actually part of the legislative branch.  For example, the President 
signs and vetoes bills, which reflect functional legislative power, even 
though these actions take place outside the legislative branch.
54
  
However, unlike when the President reviews legislation, the Chief 
Justice exercises functional judicial authority—and not functional 
legislative power—in his Senate role.  Both the Chief Justice and the 
Senate are utilizing functional judicial authority in this capacity but are 
doing so within the legislative branch.
55
  Moreover, the Chief Justice 
steps into the shoes of the presiding officer when chairing presidential 
impeachment trials.  Thus, the Chief Justice assumes the same type of 
intra-Senate responsibilities that a presiding officer does and that a 
President does not.  The Chief Justice presides over the upper chamber’s 
proceedings, makes rulings, casts deciding votes, is subject to Senate 
rules, and identifies senators to speak.  The President’s functional 
legislative activities, on the other hand, are performed entirely outside of 
the legislative chamber.  The President has no role in Senate rulemaking, 
he cannot cast a vote in the body, he is not subject to Senate rules, and 
he cannot choose who speaks on the floor; his only formal, functional 
 
 51. See Brownell, supra note 2, at 497-500 n.323.    
 52. Senate staff members, for example, should be considered part of the legislative branch 
because they are viewed as lawmakers’ alter egos and, moreover, are protected under Article I’s 
Speech or Debate Clause.  See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).    
 53. See Letter from Laurence H. Silberman, Acting Attorney General, to the Hon. Howard W. 
Cannon, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, at 6 (Sept. 20, 1974), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/092074.pdf.          
 54. See, e.g., La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 453 (1899).    
 55. See, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 409, 413 (1792) (letter of Justice Iredell and 
Judge Sitgreaves); THE FEDERALIST No. 65 at 330 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed. 1982); 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, OPINION ON POWERS OF THE SENATE RESPECTING DIPLOMATIC 
APPOINTMENTS (Apr. 24, 1790), in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 
1950), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_2_2-3s48.html; RAOUL 
BERGER, IMPEACHMENT:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 140 & n.58 (2d ed. 1974).    
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legislative actions occur prior to and after the lawmaking process has 
taken place within Congress.
56
  The Chief Justice, on the other hand, 
carries out his duties within the Senate itself.               
 A third potential counterargument could be that, because the 
Chief Justice is carrying out functional judicial power in the presiding 
officer’s chair, he is not part of the legislative branch.57  The argument 
would be that he is performing a different function from that of the Vice 
President or President Pro Tempore.
58
  This view falls short, however, 
because it treats functional power and branches of government as if they 
were one and the same.  They are not.  As noted above, the President 
exercises functional legislative power outside the legislative branch.  At 
the same time, the Senate exercises functional executive power (e.g., 
over appointments)
59
 outside the executive branch.  And, when holding 
impeachment trials, the Senate carries out functional judicial power even 
though the actions take place outside the judicial branch.
60
  In 
presidential impeachment trials, the Chief Justice is presiding over the 
Senate within the legislative branch even though the body and he are 
carrying out functional judicial power.  To view his role otherwise 
would mean that during impeachment trials, the entire Senate would 
have to be characterized as within the judicial branch because the Senate 
is exercising functional judicial power.  That cannot be so since the 
chamber’s impeachment decision cannot be overturned through judicial 
appeals.
61
   
A final potential counterargument is that the Chief Justice’s status 
is unlike that of the other official thought to moonlight in the legislative 
branch:  the Vice President.  This is based on the notion that the latter is 
“President of the Senate” and the former is not.62  The Constitution 
provides only that the Chief Justice shall “preside” during presidential 
impeachment trials; he is not formally accorded the “President of the 
 
 56. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).   
 57. The author would like to thank Todd Garvey for raising this question.   
 58. The underlying premise of this argument is also flawed.  The Vice President and President 
Pro Tempore are not limited to presiding over the Senate and breaking ties only in functional 
legislative contexts.  They can also do so regarding non-legislative matters such as consideration of 
executive and judicial branch appointments.  See, e.g., FLOYD M. RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE:  
PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES 883-84 (1974).  And, of course, the Vice President and President Pro 
Tempore exercise functional judicial power when they preside over non-presidential impeachment 
trials.  See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 92 (1805).        
 59. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137 (3d ed. 2000).      
 60. See supra note 55.   
 61. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).    
 62. The author would like to thank Joel Goldstein and Todd Garvey for raising this question.   
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Senate” title the Vice President enjoys.63  As a result, it could be argued, 
the Chief Justice has a less clear linkage to the Senate than the Vice 
President.  For two reasons this position falls short of the mark.  First, 
far less important than the title is the reality that the Chief Justice sits in 
the presiding officer’s chair and does the exact same thing that the Vice 
President does in that capacity.  No matter what the Chief Justice is 
called he is still playing a role in the internal governance and 
administration of the Senate, just like the Vice President.     
Second, according to Senate practice, it is entirely appropriate for 
senators to refer to the Chief Justice as “Mr. President.”64  This, of 
course, is how the Vice President, the President Pro Tempore and all 
other Senators are addressed when presiding over the upper chamber.  
Since the Chief Justice can be addressed in the same way as the Vice 
President, the Chief Justice’s lack of the formal title “President of the 
Senate” would seem to matter little in trying to distinguish between the 
status of the two.  At the end of the day, the four potential 
counterarguments are unpersuasive.   
This article has endeavored to show that the Chief Justice in one 
narrow context is part of the legislative branch—a conclusion that 
demonstrates the framers rejected a strict application of the doctrine of 
separation of powers to the U.S. Constitution.  Instead, they provided for 
a degree of sharing of personnel and functional power among the 
branches.
65
     
 
 63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 6.   
 64. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.   
 65. See, e.g., Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 6.   
